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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Space Shuttle Columbia was launched from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at
220:08:37:00.012 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 8, 1989. The primary
objective of this Department of Defense (DoD) STS-28 mission was classified. All
Orbiter payload services and operations in support of the DoD mission payload/cargo
were provided as planned. After a successful flight of slightly over 5 days, Columbia
landed at Edwards Air Force Base, CA at 225:09:37:53 a.m. EDT on August 13, 1989.
Significant anomalies experienced during the STS-28 mission include:
Failure of the pilot seat motor/brake assembly resulting in the pilot's seat
sliding to the full back position several times during ascent.
Observation and subsequent investigation of excessive body flap deflection
during Max Q.
Discovery of a large divot in the External Tank intertank acreage Thermal
Protection System.
• Sustained cable short by Kapton insulation.
Early boundary layer transition from laminar to turbulent flow caused by
protruding gap fillers.
These anomalies will be readdressed in the STS-34 Mission Safety Evaluation.

FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) Program Manager prior to each NSTS flight. The intent
of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a change, or potential
change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) in
the NSTS Hazard Reports. It also documents unresolved safety risk factors impacting
the STS-28 flight.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) and is updated for the Launch Minus 2 Day (L-2) Review.
For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in final postflight report format
after each NSTS flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program Manager with the NASA
Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the Program
safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical
Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some changes to the
baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level
change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which were too late to include in
formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis process are documented
along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
1_ Scope
This report addresses STS-28 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that have impact on this flight, and factors
that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect or have the
potential to affect NSTS safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These items are derived from a variety of sources such as issues,
concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower level
files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE will be updated subsequent to the mission to
add items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in seven sections as follows:
Section 1 Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a description of the STS-28 mission: a brief
flight/vehicle description, including launch data, crew size,
flight duration, launch and landing sites, and other mission-
related information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-28 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the
STS-28 flight.
Section 4 Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-28.
Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-30 mission.
Section 6 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-28
mission. Those STS-28 IFAs which are considered to represent
safety risks will be addressed in the MSE for the next NSTS
flight.
Section 7 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 6. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS.28 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of STS-28 Mission
Space Shuttle Columbia was launched from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at
220:08:37:00.012 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 8, 1989. The primary
objective of this Department of Defense (DoD) STS-28 mission was classified. All
Orbiter payload services and operations required to support the DoD mission
payload/cargo were provided as planned. After a successful flight of slightly over 5
days, Columbia landed at Edwards Air Force Base at 225:09:37:53 a.m. EDT on August
13, 1989.
Ascent performance was nominal. No Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
anomalies were reported on STS-28. Debris Containment System (DCS) modifications
implemented prior to STS-28 performed well; this was the first mission since reflight
with no debris losses.
The pilot's seat slid to the full back position several times during 2-g ascent
periods. The pilot had to drive the seat forward 2 to 3" with the motor several times,
causing spikes on the Alternating Current (AC) Bus. After the seat was repositioned, it
immediately began to drift back to the stops. (See Orbiter 1, IFA No. STS-28-02,
page 6-3.)
During postflight ascent film review, excessive body flap deflection was believed to
be observed by the film analysis team. The film was taken from the E207 tracking
camera, and witnessed at Max Q for about 10 seconds. Measurements derived from the
film were assessed to show a deflection of up to 9 ±4" (later analysis reduced this
amplitude) at a natural frequency of 8 Hertz (Hz). Deflection of approximately 2" had
been witnessed during qualification testing prior to STS-1, with a natural frequency of
12.4 Hz. (See Orbiter 15, IFA No. STS-28-24, page 6-10.)
Immediately after External Tank (ET) separation, inflight photographs of the ET
were taken by the crew. When reviewing these photographs, the debris assessment team
discovered that a large divot occurred in the ET intertank acreage Thermal Protection
System (TPS), just above the fight-hand bipod ramp. The divot size was estimated to be
approximately 23" x 15" with a shallow depth of less than 1". Shallow, cohesive TPS
failures should not provide sufficient mass and velocity to cause impacts on the Orbiter
TPS with enough energy to resul: in a safety problem.
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The teleprinter cable plugged into Main Bus C utility outlet #1 shorted causinga
1.5-secondsustainedshort circuit with a 51-amperepeak. The 10-amperecircuit breaker
did not trip, and the short sustaineditself by arc tracking of the Kapton wire until the
wire pair opened at the connector. Investigation revealed that the most likely failure
causewas long-term fatigue and stresscracking of the Kapton insulation due to repeated
sharp bending of the wires against the metal backshell tang. The continuing short,
sustainedby the Kapton insulation, illustrates the hazardsassociatedwith extensiveuse
of Kapton-insulated wire throughout the Orbiter. (SeeOrbiter 7, IFA No. STS-28-11,
page 6-6.)
Unusual low-frequency aileron movement occurred in the Mach 20 to Mach 10
range during the reentry of STS-28. Unusual Reaction Control System(RCS) and
aerosurfaceactivity was also observed. The boundary layer transition from laminar to
turbulent flow beganapproximately 250 secondsearlier than expected. Transition
normally occurs 1100to 1200secondsfollowing reentry. The Flight Control System
began to compensatefor theseexternal forces by using the aerosurfacesand RCS jets.
At no time was there a "force fight" between the aileron and RCS jets as originally
reported. Postflight analysisof surface temperature measurementsindicates transition
from laminar to turbulent flow occurred at Mach 18. Prior to STS-28,the earliest
transition was at Mach 14 during STS-1reentry. This earlier-than-normal transition
causedan extendedperiod of aeroheatingat elevated temperatures. All structural
temperatures experiencedwere within the 350"F design limit. There is a concern that
the high heating on STS-28,if coupled with the tile damageexperiencedon STS-27,
could result in burnthroughs and vehicle instability. (SeeOrbiter 18, IFA No. STS-28-
30, page 6-14.)
Postflight examination found that the Orbiter TPS sustaineda total of 76 hits of
which 20 had a major dimension of 1" or greater. This total does not include
approximately 100to 150hits on the base heat shield and degradation to the upper-
surfacewhite tiles that was not the result of debris impact. The distribution of hits on
the Orbiter TPS does not point to a single sourcefor ascentdebris, but indicates a
sheddingof ice and TPS debris from random sources. The majority of the lower-surface
damagewas concentratedaft of the main landing gear doors,with approximately an
equal amount on each side of the centerline. Basedon the severityof damageas
indicated by surface area and depth, this flight is consideredto be better than average.
Postlanding walkdown of runway 17L wasperformed starting approximately 15
minutes after landing. Severalpiecesof the outboard forward corner tile from the right-
hand main landing gear door were found near the end of the runway, close to the point
where the landing gear doors were opened. The missingtile corner wasapproximately
6" x 4". Ten pieces of Ames gap filler material were also found in this area. A small
piece of foil insulation material from the SSME nozzle was found approximately 200
yards from wheel stop.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: August 8, 1989
• Launch Time: 8:37:00.012 a.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
• TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
• Alternate TAL Site: Moron, Spain
• Landing Date: August 13, 1989
• Landing Time: 9:37.53 a.m. EDT
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Runway 17
• Mission Duration: 5 Days, 1 Hour
• Crew Size: 5
• Inclination: 57" (declassified after mission)
• Altitude: Classified (DoD)
• Orbiter: OV-102 Columbia
• SSMEs: 2019, 2022, 2028
• ET: ET-31
• SRBs: BI-028
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2.3 Orbiter Experiments
The Orbiter Experiments (OEX) utilize the Space Shuttle as a vehicle to collect
research-quality data in the technology disciplines that will augment the Research and
Technology data base to support future spacecraft design concepts and enhance the
operational efficiency of current spacecraft designs. Residual Development Flight
Instrumentation (DFI) sensors aboard OV-102 are utilized to provide in-place direct
measurements and recordings of Orbiter environment parameters to allow computation
of Orbiter flight qualities and coefficients. Experiment hardware is installed and
integrated with the data systems. The equipment is treated as an integral part of the
Orbiter. Design is to Orbiter requirements and specifications (NSTS 07700, Vol. X),
and for autonomous closed-loop operation independent of Orbiter systems or operations
(except power, Interrange Instrumentation Group B (IRIG-B) time, Multiplexer-
Demultiplexer (MDM) commands, active cooling). OEX functional failure will not
affect primary mission success or Orbiter operations.
The OEX Systems are unique to OV-102 and are not installed on the other
Orbiter vehicles. This will be the second flight with OEX Systems installed (the first
flight was on STS-61C).
The OEX Systems flown on STS-28 are:
• SEADS
• SILTS
• ACIP
• SSO
• FFSSO
• AIP
- Shuttle Entry Air Data System
- Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing
- Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package
- Support System for OEX
- SCM - System Control Module
- Tape Recorder
- PCM - Pulse Code Modulator
- Forward Fuselage SSO
- Aerothermal Instrumentation Package.
OEX Systems to be installed on OV-102 for STS-32 are:
• OARE
• TGHE
• CSE
• AIPEH
- Orbital Acceleration Research Equipment
- Tile Gap Heating Effects
- Catalytic Surface Effects
- Aerothermal Instrumentation Package Enhanced.
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2.4
Other OEX Systemsare:
• SUMS - Shuttle Upper Atmospheric Mass Spectrometer (was not flown
on STS-28 due to lack of SUMS Orbiter Reinforced Carbon-
Carbon (RCC) Chin Panel).
• HIRAP - High Resolution Accelerometer Package (was not flown due to
malfunction, and corrective action did not support STS-28
launch date).
Payload
Payload Bay: Classified (DoD)
Middeck: Classified (DoD)
NASA Headquarters Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance did
not participate in the Safety Reviews for the DoD payloads. NASA Headquarters Safety
Division, Code QS, did participate in review of the Integrated Cargo Hazard Report
(ICHR) by the System Safety Review Panel (SSRP).
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-28 ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of the safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved or
not a safety concern for STS-28 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-28 flight. The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item is addressed,
the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item,
and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM COMMENT -
Section 4: Resolved Safety. Risk Factors
Orbiter 1 Gaseous Oxygen (GOX)
Flow Control Valve (FCV)
sluggish operation or
lockup due to
contamination.
There were no instances of sluggish
GOX FCV operation reported on
STS-28. However, the first instance of a
sluggish Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) FCV
was experienced. Space Shuttle Main
Engine (SSME) GH2 FCV #1 indicated
sluggish response during the first three
minutes of ascent. Indications were that
the FCV would not fully stroke and
would not respond when commanded
during thrust bucket. GH2 FCVs #2 and
#3 operated normally during the entire
ascent. Postflight leak checks found that
FCV #1 was stuck in the open position.
All three GH2 FCVs were removed and
sent to the vendor for inspection.
Tolerances were found to be tighter than
specification: 0.007" versus 0.009" to
0.013" specification tolerance. GH_ FCV
operation will be readdressed in the
STS-34 MSE.
Orbiter 15 Environmenral Control and
Life Support System
(ECLSS) freon coolant loop
flow rates are degrading on
OV-102.
As expected, the OV-102 freon loops
flow continued to degrade during the
mission. Freon loop #1 degraded
approximately 50 pounds per hour
(lb/hr) when the freon loop radiator
panel outside temperature dropped
below -60*F. Loop #2 degraded
approximately 100 lb/hr during the same
time period. The degradation in both
loops has been attributed to possible
water contamination in the freon. In
both cases, the freon flow rate did not
degrade below the Flight Rule minimum
limit. Plans are to replace the pump
package on loop #2 prior to the next
OV-102 flight, STS-32.
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Section 5:
Orbiter 4
ITEM
ST$-30 Inflight Anomalies
Fuel Cell (FC) #2
Hydrogen (H2) flow meter
failed.
COMMENT
On STS-28, FC #1 H, flow meter began
to drift high at Mission Elapsed Time
12:30 and later exhibited erratic
behavior with intermittent upper limit
indications. Plans are to fly as is until
there is a requirement to remove
FC #1, since access to the flow meter
requires FC removal.
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-28 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a list of the safety risk factors that were considered resolved
for STS-28. These items have been reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution is provided for each safety risk
factor. The safety position with respect to resolution is based on findings resulting from
System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB)
reviews or other special investigation findings. It represents the safety assessment
arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and
inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
- 4-1
SECTION 4 INDEX
INTEGRATION
1
2
3
Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate pyrobolt Factor of Safety.
Instrument and Electronic Assembly anomaly.
Liquid Oxygen umbilical mate anomaly.
ORBITER
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Gaseous Oxygen Flow Control Valve sluggish operation or lockup due to
contamination. (IFA on STS-26, -27, and -29)
Right-hand brake line vibration at 55 Hertz.
Debris can prevent External Tank doors from closing.
Helium Regulator contamination.
Orbital Maneuvering System engine oxidizer inlet line.
OV-102 has two Multiplexer-Demultiplexers which may contain Erie
ceramic capacitors that are prone to failure.
Data Processing System Data Bus timing.
Engine #3 Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen Recirculation Pump
damage.
Liquid Hydrogen Recirculation Pump failure. (STS-30 Preflight Anomaly)
Bolt failure in the Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Turbine module.
Liquid Oxygen Prevalve closure software implementation.
Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing Pod mass increase at tip of
tail.
Improved Auxiliary Power Unit failure at Sundstrand.
Umbilical Retract Actuator may fail in extended mode.
Environmental Control and Life Support System freon coolant loop flow
rates are degrading on OV-102.
Potential Auxiliary Power Unit exhaust duct leak.
Auxiliary Power Unit Fuel Isolation Valve anomaly.
_SME
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Engine 0212 High-Pressure Oxygen Turbopump failure during testing.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump leak.
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump balance piston cavity pressure port
standoffs weld defects.
Low-pressure fuel duct flex joint failure.
Main Combustion Chamber/Nozzle G-15 seal crack/discoloration.
A High Pressure Fuel Turbopump bearing cage taken from stock for
assembly was found to be cracked.
Improperly-sized Lee Jets could be installed in flight engines.
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SSME
8
9
10
SECTION 4 INDEX - (Cont.)
Engine 0209 Heat Exchanger leak.
Damper pocket cracks on the High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump first stage
turbine blades.
Engine 2011 nozzle tube bulge.
SRM
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Failure of the left secondary joint heater to pass the Dielectric
Withstanding Voltage test.
Soft Stat-O-Seal retainers.
Cold-temperature exposure.
PV-1 Nozzle strain aberration.
Barrier Booster housing bore sealing surface scratches.
Uncured Room Temperature Vulcanizate in STS-30 Nozzle Joint #3.
Gouges and pits in Aft Stiffener boltholes.
Stiffener Stub ligament cracks.
Safe and Arm (Device) failure to cycle during bench check at Kennedy
Space Center.
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor igniter inner Gask-O-Seal leakage.
SRB
1 Solid Rocket Booster K5NA application in the presence of water.
E___T
1
2
3
4
5
External Tank monoball rotation.
Liquid Hydrogen level sensor circuits read low resistance values.
Prolongation data from two lots of vertical strut forgings did not meet
stress corrosion cracking acceptance requirements.
Liquid Oxygen aft feedline elbow residue.
Teflon material found in Gaseous Oxygen Quick Disconnect.
GFE
1 Dale Resistors in Pyro Initiator Controllers.
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SECTION 5
STS-30 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of inflight anomalies arising from the STS-30 mission.
Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are
provided.
5-1
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
SECTION 5 INDEX
Cabin pressure transducer failed.
The #2 Gaseous Hydrogen pressure system temperature indicator failed.
Center engine Liquid Hydrogen inlet pressure transducer failed.
Fuel Cell #2 Hydrogen flow meter failed.
Left engine Liquid Hydrogen inlet pressure transducer biased low.
Reaction Control System Jet R1U failed off, post External Tank
separation.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Gas Generator fuel pump "A" heaters
inoperative.
Right Orbital Maneuvering System fuel total quantity gage failed.
Right Reaction Control System A-leg oxidizer helium isolation valve failed
open.
Water Spray Boiler #2 Gaseous Nitrogen pressure decay.
General Purpose Computer #4 failed to sync.
Engine Helium fill Check Valve failures.
The right Orbital Maneuvering System Gaseous Nitrogen pressure
regulator regulated low.
Main landing gear fluid leak.
Nose wheel steering enable late.
Ding on forward window #6.
The Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator reading was high during Flight
Control System checkout.
Bulkhead blanket damage.
SRM
1
2
3
SRB
1
2
3
4
Factory joint weather seal aft edge unbonding.
Solid Rocket Motor nozzle snubber ring displacement.
Cut in the secondary seal of the outer gasket.
Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster main parachute failure.
Debris lost from multiple Debris Containment Systems.
Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attachment cover sheared
fasteners.
Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster External Tank attachment ring cap and
web separation.
5-2
SECTION 5 INDEX - (Cont.)
Leak in 4" Liquid Hydrogen recirculation line.
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SECTION 6
STS-28 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of inflight anomalies arising from the STS-28 mission.
Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are
provided.
6-1
SECTION 6 INDEX
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Pilot seat moved during ascent.
Vernier thruster F5R annunciated fail leak.
Nose Landing Gear Weight On Wheels indication failed off.
Fuel Cell # 1 Hydrogen flow erratic.
Abort light failure.
Forward Reaction Control System F5L heater failed on.
Main Bus C utility outlet #1 teleprinter short circuit. (Teleprinter cable
anomaly)
Auxiliary Power Unit isolation valve talkback failure.
Environmental Control and Life Support System freon coolant loop low
flow rate.
Right-hand Orbiter Maneuvering System fuel quantity gage reading high.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 test line temperature read high.
STS-28 crew experienced eye irritation.
Hydraulic System #2 unloader valve operated out of specification.
Excessive body flap deflection during ascent.
Orbiter structural heat damage.
Crew reported a loud thump/thud at first OPS-1 transition.
Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve #1 showed sluggish response.
Early assymetrical boundary layer encounter resulted in anomalous
aerosurface movement, usage of more than a normal amount of RCS
propellant, and excessive Thermal Protection System damage.
Umbilical foam detached from the External Tank Liquid Oxygen 17"
disconnect.
SRB
1 Loose bolts on the left Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attachment
Ring.
SRM
1 Gask-O-Seal void found during postflight inspection.
KSC
1 Mobile Launch Platform recorders were accidently turned off.
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SECTION 7
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 6. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required.
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AC
ACA
ACIP
AEDC
AFB
AIP
AIPEH
a.m.
APU
ARS
ATP
AVVI
BFS
BTU
CA
CRES
CSE
CV
CVAS
DAR
DC
DCS
DEU
DFI
DoD
DOL
DPS
DR
DWV
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Alternating Current
Annunciator Control Assembly
Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package
Arnold Engineering Development Center
Air Force Base
Aerothermal Instrumentation Package
Aerothermal Instrumentation Package Enhanced
Before Noon (Ante Meridiem)
Auxiliary Power Unit
Air Revitalization System
Acceptance Test Program
Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator
Back-Up Flight System; Backup Flight Software
Bus Terminal Unit
California
Corrosion Resistant Steel
Catalytic Surface Effects
Check Valve
Configuration Verification Accounting System
Deviation Approval Request
Direct Current
Debris Containment System
Display Electronics Unit
Development Flight Instrumentation
Department of Defense
Day of Launch
Data Processing System
Discrepancy Report
Dielectric Withstanding Voltage
A-1
ECC
ECLSS
EDT
EIU
ET
ET/SEP
ETA
F
FC
FCL
FCS
FCV
FDA
FeC1
FFSSO
FIV
FMEA/CIL
FOS
fps
FRI
FRR
ft
g
GCV
GFE
GFI
GG
GH2
GN2
GO2
GOX
GPC
GSE
GUCP
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Eaton Consolidated Controls Corporation
Environmental Controls and Life Support System
Eastern Daylight Time
Engine Interface Unit
External Tank
External Tank/Separation
External Tank Attachment
Fahrenheit
Fuel Cell
Freon Coolant Loop
Flight Control System
Flow Control Valve
Fault Detection and Annunciator
Iron Chloride
Forward Fuselage Support System for Orbiter Experiments
Fuel Isolation Valve
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Feet Per Second
Flow Recirculation Inhibitor
Flight Readiness Review
Feet
Gravitational Acceleration
Gaseous Oxygen Control Valve
Government Furnished Equipment
Ground Fault Interrupt
Gas Generator
Gaseous Hydrogen
Gaseous Nitrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate
A-2
n 2
HCI
HDP
HGDS
HIRAP
HMF
HPFTP
HPOTP
HPV
HR
hr
Hz
i/o
DM:>U
ICHR
ID
IEA
IFA
in-lb
INTG
IRIG-B
JSC
KSC
L-2
lb
lb/hr
LCC
LH
LH2
LiOH
LO2
LOX
LP
LSFR
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Hydrogen
Hydrogen Chloride
Holddown Post
Hazardous Gas Detection System
High Resolution Accelerometer Package
Hypergol Maintenance Facility
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
High Pressure Valve
Hazard Report
Hour
Hertz
Input/Output
Improved Auxiliary Power Unit
Integrated Cargo Hazard Report
Inside Diameter
Instrument and Electronic Assembly, Integrated Electronic Assembly
Inflight Anomaly
Inch-Pound
Integration
Interrange Instrumentation Group B
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Launch Minus 2 Days (Review)
Pounds
Pounds Per Hour
Launch Commit Criteria
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Lithium Hydroxide
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Launch Pad
Launch Site Flow Review
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MADS
MCC
MDM
ME
MEC
MECO
MET
mg/ft 2
MLP
MMC
MPS
MPSS
MPU
MS
MSE
MSFC
NASA
NBR
NLG
NPSP
NSI
NSRS
NSTS
2
OARE
OD
OEX
OMI
OMRSD
OMS
OPB
OPO
ORBI
OV
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Modular Auxiliary Data Systems
Main Combustion Chamber
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
Main Engine
Maine Engine Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Mission Elapsed Time
Milligram Per Square Foot
Mobile Launch Platform
Martin Marietta Corporation
Main Propulsion System
Main Parachute Support Structure
Magnetic Pickup Unit
Margin of Safety
Mission Safety Evaluation
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nitrite Butadiene Rubber
Nose Landing Gear
Net Positive Static Pressure
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
National Space Transportation System
Oxygen
Orbiter Acceleration Research Equipment
Outside Diameter.
Orbiter Experiments
Operations and Maintenance Instruction
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Oxidizer Preburner
Orbiter Project Office
Orbiter
Orbiter Vehicle
A-4
PAR
PC
PCASS
PCM
PFS
PIC
PMBT
ppm
PRACA
PRCB
psi
psia
psig
PTI
Q
QD
RCC
RCN
RCS
RH
RI
RM
rpm
RSRM
RTLS
RTV
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Prelaunch Assessment Review
Chamber Pressure
Program Compliance Assurance and Status System
Pulse Code Modulator
Primary Flight Software
Pyro Initiator Controller
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature
Parts Per Million
Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
Program Requirements Control Board
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Program Test Inputs
Dynamic Pressure
Quick Disconnect
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon
Requirements Change Notice
Reaction Control System
Right-Hand
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Revolutions Per Minute
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Return to Launch Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanizate
A-5
S/N
S&A
sdm
SCM
SEADS
SEM
SEP
SILTS
SIT
SLA
SMIA
SPC
SRB
SRM
SRM&QA
SSC
SSME
SSO
SSRP
STS
SUMS
TAL
TGHE
TPS
TVC
USBI
VAB
VDC
VREL
WONG
WOW
WSB
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Serial Number
Safe & Arm (Device)
Standard Cubic Centimeters per Second
Standard Cubic Inches Per Minutes
System Control Module
Shuttle Entry Air Data System
Scanning Electron Microscope
Separation
Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing
System Integration Test
Super Light Ablator
Serial Multiplexer Interface Adapter
Shuttle Processing Contractor
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance
Stennis Space Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Support System for Orbiter Experiments
System Safety Review Panel
Space Transportation System
Shuttle Upper Atmospheric Mass Spectrometer
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Tile Gap Heating Effects
Thermal Protection System
Thrust Vector Controlf
United Space Boosters, Inc.
Vehicle Assembly Building
Volts Direct Current
Relative Velocity
Weight-On-Nose-Gear
Weight on Wheels
Water Spray Boiler
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